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What To Do With Space 
Tl1 e possible uses of space- some within ou r present capahilities 
and solll l' that lc ill open up as we lcam 1110re alw ut 
the space enl"iron111 ent. 
hu Clark B . Millikan 
"Space' is a word which for many, p erhaps all , 
of us has acquired a comple te ly new a nd sometimes 
disturbin g connotation. For many traditionall y 
eastern Ame ricans it has b een used vague!) to d e-
scribe, w ith appropriate adject i' es, th e regions to 
th e west whic h the ir hardier a nd more reckless 
members had in the last century entered , pene-
trated , and conq uNcd . II itkr attach ed his own 
adjecti ve and made it, a t leas t in its Ge rm an ver-
sion, a term of opprobrium to our parents a nd our-
selves. I suppose the Hussian fc•elin g about space 
has b een related to the ir endless steppes, as to tlw 
marinN it has implied the vastttess beyo nd the 
horizon of his sea . Astronomc•rs ha, c associated it 
with the expanses of the universe itself. 
\Yorkers and practitioners in a<:'rona ntics ha, (' 
been forced into p e rhaps th e most perplexing and 
diffic ult adjustment in their concept of the term. 
For approximately 50 years they had struggled-
with , it must he sa id, considerable success- to un-
derstand, mas ter, a nd utilize a tiny skin around our 
own planet whic h constitutes the atmosplwre in 
which W (' live and through w hich we have man-
aged to move ourselves a nd b e lo n g ings w ith a 
rather re markable d egree of regularity. economy, 
and even swift com fort. 
Sudd c> nl y, w ith th e fi rs t Sputni ks. th e ae ro-
nautical fraternity was projected into an entirely 
diffe rent medium. O ne thing whic h mad<' the tran-
sition difficult is th e fact that there is no sha rp 
harrie r bel ween the regions o f ope ra tion for clas-
sical aeronautics and those of outer space. \Ve h ad 
been famili ar in ac>ronautics with some rathe r sp e-
c ific harrier!>. One, the speed o f sound in air, is very 
precisely defin (•d by the temperature. For example, 
in thc> atmosplw ric temperatures we normally en-
count er it varies h etwec>n ab out 650 a nd a littl e 
over 700 miles per hour. But this a nticipat(•d har-
rie r, whic h had been of g reat concern as we began 
to approach these speed s, turn ed oul to he no 
harrier at a ll hut just a b road region in w hich a 
little special eng ineering ca re was requ ired , and 
through which we have, in fact, passed as a quite 
routine matter. 
The region separating "classical aeronautics"' and 
outN space is not similar!) definable. It C\ten<h 
over a h eight o f a hundred miles o r more, and in 
this region the fluid prop<•rties w ith w hich we hav(! 
been fa111ilia r c ha nge gradu a ll y to thos(' mo re 
tennous than the p hysicist has ever been able Lo 
produce in his most rc> fin c>d small-scale laboratory 
e xperimen t s. P e rh a ps a n e\'c n more profound 
c hange in t lw environments than the relatively 
simple a ltcrat ion of Auid prop<'rties is the fact tha t 
outer space is in fac t fill ed w ith enormously cner-
g('lic part ides and radia tions, w hich a n • filtered out 
or d egen<•ra ted by our a tmosphe re, so tha t we are 
not only protc•c tcd from th em, hut cannol even ob-
ser\'e the m to t r~ and d eciplw r the messages they 
may be bearing regardin g th e nature of our uni-
verse. C learl y, scientists must he excited about the 
new exploratory possibilities which have opened 
up. 
For a considerable number of years now, we h ave 
been penetrating and even piercing what thus 
seems more like a blanket than a barrier. The cnl-
cial element which h as made this possible is, of 
course, the development of the rocket motor which, 
for the first time, made it possible for man, within 
small dimensions, to release enormous amounts of 
controlled energy in a very short time- producing 
the tremendous power required to accelerate ob-
jects to the velocities (some 25,000 miles per h our ) 
required to get through the resisting blanket of our 
atmosph ere. 
A very modest and old-fashion ed rocket m otor 
like that of the German wartime V -2 is producing 
on the order of 10 million horsepower at burn-out, 
in a machine that is only a coupl e of feet in length 
and width, excluding the fuel tanks. This type of 
device has made possible our whole arsenal of In-
tercontinental Ballistic Missiles ( ICBM's) which 
consti tute so large a share of our deterrent force, 
designed to keep the world at peace. And these 
missiles do rise far above our atmospheric blanket 
in their trajectory from earth launch to earth target. 
In this sense, then , they belong to the new species 
of spacecraft. However, I shall excl ude th em from 
my considerations h ere, since their function is es-
sentially unrelated to space as I am using the term. 
True spacecraft 
Nevertheless, it is the ICBM's, with th eir urgent 
military justification, which have in fact led to the 
possibility of true spacecraft, whose mission ancl 
raison d 'etre is in the vast volume above our atmos-
phere. The firsl Sputnik w hich circled the globe 
was ahnost certainly a device mounted in place of 
a warhead on top of one of th e more or less stand-
ard Soviet ICBM's. The Soviets beat us to this 
achievement, w ith all its global psychological re-
actions, for two very simple reasons. The first, 
political , is well-known: As a US policy it was 
decided , in connection with the so-call ed Interna-
tional Geophysical Y car, to divorce our satellite 
effort completely from our military l CB !{program. 
The Russians decided to coordinate their e fforts 
to the fullest extent possible, and did so very ef-
fectively. 
Incidentally, with the failure of om first satellite 
attempts and the enormous worldwide impact of 
the Russian success, we m ad e a sudden reversal in 
our policy. A relatively small ballistic missile al-
ready developed by the Army was made available 
as a first-stage booster, and in the incredibly short 
lime of 88 clays Caltech 's Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
put together a series of upper stages which placed 
our first small payload in an orbit about the earth 
on January :31, 1958. This, hy the way, was a much 
high er orbit than those of the two preceding Rus-
sian Sputniks, both of which grazed the atmos-
pheric blanket enough to slow down within a few 
months, enter the atmosphere, hurn up like m eteors, 
and disappear. But our little Explorer I is still 
whirling serenel y in its orbit far ab ove the earth. 
The monster 
There is a second area, other than that of being 
first in the race, in which the Soviets arc still leading 
us, and this is in the size of the spacecraft they have 
been able to launch. The explanation for this lead 
is also a fasc inating and ironic story. In the earl y 
SO's our Air Force (and , T am sure, its Soviet coun-
terparts ) were stud ying the possibility of transport-
ing warheads across the vast distances between 
each other's countri es by means of rockets. In fact, 
contractors to our Air Force had worked out many 
of the design details of just such an ICBM, carry-
,. ipg the best nuclear warhead then available- a 
t.1'uly m onstrous device which taxed the capacity 
of our largest b omber, the B-29, lo get it off the 
ground. The resulti ng ICBM was correspondingly 
monstrous, since the thrust and size of the initial 
rocket booster stage is directly proportional to the 
weight and size of the final payload to be delivered. 
To even the starryest-cycd of the blue-suit or pro-
fessional airmen responsible for Air Force policy, 
such a monster was a little hard to buy, much less 
sell to Congressional committees h olding the 
necessary purse strings. So they resorted to a device 
which I am afraid has gotten into our system: 
They collected a series of committees composed of 
supposedly nnbi asecl hut knowledgeable ( and per-
haps even, hope full y, wise ) civilians to study the 
problem and advise th e m. 1 was unfortunate 
cnongh to b e chairman of one of the first of these 
committees. The booster which was described to 
us, w ith its cluster of five or seven great rocket 
en gines delivering well over a million pounds of 
thrust , and its enormously complex p umpin g, 
plumbing, a nd control systems, looked like such a 
formid able engineering job thal we essentially 
threw up our hands and said, "Back to your labora-
tories and drafting hoards, b oys, before you commit 
yo urself to building such a b east." 
A year or so later General Benny Schriever, cer-
tainl y one of the ablest of our military officers-
and at the time, l think, a very junior hut highly 
technical colonel-set up a new committee to look 
a t the same problem. This one was headed by the 
famous mathema tician, Johnny von Neumann, and 
conta ined unconventio na l thinke rs such as Si 
Ramo, Pat H yland, George Kistiakowsky, and 
several others. 
In our d eliberations, one factor turned out to he 
absolutely crucial : Johnny von Neumann had been 
worki ng with the Los Alamos n uclear scientists who 
were devoting their lives to the developmt'nt of 
improved nuclear devices. The revolutionary con-
cept of th e thermonuclear reaction, us ing fus ion 
of light elements rather th an fission or splitting-up 
of heavy clements, was much in the air there', al-
though p rotected behind one of th C' ti ghtest se-
curity barriers yet erected. This concept, if it could 
be made to work, would make' the old mass iv<' 
fi ssion bombs completely obsolete, and make it pos-
sible to pack enormously more explosive energy 
into a very much smaller and lighter package. 
Although definiti ve tests were not yet avail abl c>, 
Johnny had enough fa ith in his and his colleaguc>s' 
calcula tions to bring to our committee the assur-
a nce that these smaller warheads would he avail-
able even before the missiles could he produced to 
carry them. For once, a committee ca me up w ith 
a positive and powerful recommenda tion, which 
was: The country should immedi ately, at th c> vc>ry 
highest military priority, undertake the design of 
two altern ative boosters, with all the associated and 
excessively complex gad getry, to permit th e accu-
rate delivery of these anticipated small hut potent 
thermonuclear warheads to distances of at least 
5500 nautical m iles. 
The r ecommenda t ion was swiftl y carri ed 
th rough the military channels to th e President him-
self, who gave his approval. Benny Schriever was 
given complete authori ty, normal b ureaucratic red 
tape was essentially elimina ted , all necessary funds 
were made available, and th e result , in a pheno-
menally small number of years, was the famil y of 
Atl as and Titan I CBM's whi ch are now being em-
placed throughout th e vast uninhabited areas of 
our country, manned b y trained military personnel, 
to constitute our basic d eterrent against the Soviet 
threat of world domination . 
Missile gap? 
Inc identally, it has become clear th at , with the 
fan tastically rapid development of these two weap-
ons systems, the so-called missile gap which was 
much b ruited about a couple of years ago was, in 
fact, a non-ex istent fa ntasy, and that we have in 
actualit y had a considerably larger and more ef-
fective ICBt-.1 system than have the Soviets at any 
comparable point in time. 
The iron ic aspect of this correct and brilliantly 
executed military d ecision has become slowly ap-
paren t in the non-m il itary or psychological cold 
war area. It seems now increasingly apparent that, 
at the time of the monstro us fiss ion bombs, the 
Hussians d id not appreciate, or at least gamble on, 
the future availability of the m uch smaller thermo-
nuclear warheads. Thc>y decided to go all out for 
the solution of the for midable engineering prob-
lems of designing and constructing the million-
pound-thrust class of boosters whi ch woul d he 
required for ICBM's carry ing tl1<' then-available 
fiss ion bomb warheads. T his engineering challenge 
they mastered with amazing competence. Thus, 
when their own nuclear developments led them to 
the smalle r thermonuclear warh eads, they had 
large, and militarily inefficient , reserves of booster 
capacity ava il able. From the m ili tary point of viC\\' 
it certainl y appears tha t ours was th<' wiser decision. 
But, as the profound i mpl ica t ion~ of the effect 
on world opinion of putt ing massive spacecraft into 
orbit and outer space became apparent, the Rus-
sians, with their far larger boosters, had a tremen-
dous advantage. T he Soviet spacecraft which have 
been launched arc far more massive and bul ky than 
oms, and although we have now embarked on an 
impress ive large-boos ter devcloprnenl program, it 
will clearly he some years before we can launch the 
size of spacecraft wh ich the Hussians already have 
clone. r-. reanwhil c, they will certainly not be stand-
ing still . 
Successfu/larmc/z(>s- US cs. USSR 
In any case, both we and the Soviets have our 
emissaries and p robers in space and it is indeed 
fascinating to speculate as to how we shall exploit 
this newly-d iscovered capab ili ty. First, a word as 
to the present status of matters in this area. As of 
last fall , th e la test date for wh ich J have complete 
figures, th ere had been approximately 83 success-
ful launches of US spacecraft and about 28 USSR 
successes. Many of these have been rela tively low-
altitude orb it satellites wh ich have fallen hack in to 
the atmosphere in a few days or months, so that 
the then current count of spacecraft orb iting the 
earth or the sun '\vas 42 for the US and only 8 for 
the USSR. I n the las t few months our cou nt has 
increased considerably wh ile the Hussians appar-
ently have been somewhat less active. \ Ve have 
certa in ly published, and probably have obtained, 
far more scientific data from ou r more numerous 
fli ghts than have the Russians. However, their larg-
est spacecraft, weighing of the order of five or six 
tons, arc far larger than any we have yet sent up, 
wh ile tlw great majority of our payloads have been 
only of the order of a few hundred pounds. 
Prior to the first two Russian Sputnik satellites 
late in 1957 we had in this country only a very 
meager scientific satellite program, sponsored b y 
the ational Academy of Sciences in connection 
wi th the In ternational Geoph ysical Year, during 
which all of th e major powers, including R11ssia, 
wcrc joined in a scien tific exploration of the 
earth's lands, seas, and atmosphere. A few, perhaps 
visionary, officers were considerin g and <'V<'n dis-
cussing possible military rC'asons for explorin g 
space, hut the then Secreta ry of Defense issued an 
astonishing directive that the nasty word was not 
to be used in public addresses, so these visionari es 
were effectively muzzled. 
The impact of Sputnik 
Thc extraordinary worldwide psychologica l im-
pact of the first Sputnik co mple tely changed our 
United States attitude towards space. Each of the 
military services started a frantic program to estab-
li sh its posilion in the new en vironment, and the 
Congress in 1958, h y legislation, set up the National 
Aeronautics and Spac<' Administratio n (NASA ) to 
be responsible for the country's non-military or 
civil ian space acti vities. Both th e military and 
1 ASA programs soon h<'gan an ever-increas ing rate 
of growth which rC'cC' ived a still fu rther impe tus 
wh <>n President Kenn edy, about two years ago, 
announced the US national program of S<'nding 
as tronauts to the moon and bringing them sa fely 
back within the present decade of th e 60's. 
The government b ud gets in this area for the 
fiscal year indicate the fantastic mag nitude of our 
space venture, and suggest th C' scope of its impact 
even on our more conventional economic life. The 
budget figures for '61, '62, and '63 start with 850 
million for th e military and 900 million for NASA, 
progress through th e fi scal year 1962 with 1 billion, 
.'300 million for the milita ry and 1 billion, 800 mil-
lion for NASA, and reach the approved fi gurC's for 
'6.'3 of l billion, 700 million for the mi litary and 3 
bi llio n, 700 million for NASA-a total of 51h billion 
dollars. The total 1964 space budget, still under 
discussion in Congress, is likely to wind up in the 
neighborhood of 7 billion. ASA's adm inistrator, 
1\tr. James W ebb, has estimated tha t his program 
will require a total of some 35 to 50 bi llion dollars 
over the next decade. 
It certainly secms to he no trivia l question to 
ask "YVhat To Do With Space," and unfortunately 
the answers are highly confused and unclear, so 
that 1 shall try only to suggest a few of the things 
that we can and arc certainly going to try very 
hard to do. 
In trying to set up a categorization of the areas 
in which space may appropriately be exploited , 
there a re some very clear boundaries of demar-
cation, hut there is one very basic factor which may 
be of overriding importanc<> and which tends to 
make all the natural division lines hazy and ill-
defined. This is the fun d amental contest through-
out the globe hc twecn the Marxist and what we 
ca)] th e Frec-EntcrprisC' concepts of the form the 
world is d estin ed to assum e. This is so basic and 
deep-rooted a conflict that practically every area 
of human endeavor has its impact upon it. T he ex-
citing exploitation of the new space environment 
is certainly one of the most profoundly influential 
of human activities in this respect , and such con-
siderations basicall y a ffect <'ach o f the areas T shall 
mention . These effects arc so profound and com-
plex, however , that it is q uite hopeless even to 
explore them in a brief survey such as this. Accord-
ingly, T propose to ignor<' them, not because of a 
lack of awareness of their importance, but because 
the scope of my remarks would limit me to such 
an incomplete and fragmentary treatment as to 
make even th e attempt ridiculous. 
Manned or 1/llllla nnec/ eX]J/oration? 
There are, then, it seems to me, three basic mo-
tivations in th e enormously expensive development 
of th C' 11C'W space environmC'nt to which we seem to 
he irrevocably committed. The first is th e explora-
tory or truly adventurous and scientific motivation 
which really underlies, or at least is p rerequisite 
to, the other two. It can, as a practical matter, be 
divided into two separate sub-areas: unmanned 
and manned. The former is perhaps the more truly 
scienti fi c in moti vation ; the second, more in the 
tradition of the great explorers like Marco Polo, 
Columbus, Magellan, Livingston , Scott, 1allory, 
and countless others of our restless heroes. 
Our na tional unman ned scientific space pro-
gram is a NASA program primaril y divided into 
two parts: the earth satellite, and the lunar-inter-
planetary regions. 
The Earth Satellite Program is essentially the 
responsibility of NASA's Goddard Laboratory out-
side of Washington . Most of the 70 NASA space-
craft launches scheduled through 1963 belong in 
this category. They include orbiting astronomical 
observatories, orbiting geoph ysical observatories, 
and orbiting solar observatories. There are also 
many exp eriments to learn the radiation and other 
characteristics outside of the atmosphere, to test 
ion and electrical propulsion engines to furni sh tiny 
thrusts for long-time interplanetary travel, and so 
on. 
Many of th e plann ed experiments in this category 
support other of the space progra ms mention ed 
below. 
The Unmanned Pmgrom 
The Lunar and Interplaneta ry Unmann ed Pro-
gram is assigned to the Jet Propulsion La boratory 
( JPL ) operated by Caltech und er contract with 
NASA. The first series of spacecraft in this program 
are called Ran gers. They usc existing boos ters, and 
are planned to impact, land on , and explore the 
moon . The highly complicated space opera tions 
are controlled from our three g reat 85-foot radio 
dish es n ear Barstow, Californi a; Woomera, Aus-
tralia; and Johannesburg, South Africa. So far fi ve 
la unches h ave b een m ade; three fail ed b ecause of 
booster troubles, and the other two did not ac-
complish their intended mission of landing a seis-
mograph on the moon and sendin g h ack seismic 
information b y radio. In th ese two cases malfunc-
tions of components in the spacecraft caused on e 
to impact on the hack side of th e moon, where all 
contact with it was lost , whil e the o th er missed th e 
moon by some 40,000 miles and is now in silent 
orbit about the sun . A further series of Ran gers is 
now in preparation, of which it is expected th at the 
first w ill b e launch ed late in 1963, carrying a tele-
vision cam era to ob serve th e moon's surface as the 
Ranger approach es for its crash landing. The tele-
vision pic tures will be tra nsmitted to our ground 
receiving stations b y radio . 
The n ext series of JPL spacecraft have b een given 
the n ame Surveyor. They are h eing d esigned to h e 
slowed down b y rockets so as to land softl y on the 
moon. They will carry a variety of instrum ents to 
make observations of the moon surface and even 
to drill som e distance b elow the surface, bring up 
samples of th e sub-s urface material, subject them 
to certain physical and chemical tests, a nd again 
transmit the res ults b ack to earth b y radio. These 
missions will require larger boosters, w hich are 
under d evelopment by other N ASA laboratories, 
and a total of seven flights is now sch edul ed for the 
1964-65 p eriod. 
The initial spacecraft of the JPL Interpla netar y 
Program is the Mariner, which is design ed for a 
series of exploratory fli ghts to th e p lan ets Mars 
and Venus. The first of these fli ghts was launch ed 
on August 27, 1962, and , a fter mid-course cotTec-
tion s carried out upon command from the ground 
tracking stations on D ecember 14, p assed within 
some 20,000 m iles of the Venus surface, which h ad 
been the ori ginal objective of the fli gh t. As Ma-
riner p assed b y Yen us a t a distance of about 36 m il-
lion miles from the earth, a nu mb er of scientific ex-
p eriments were turned on hy comm and from the 
Goldstone tracking station. 
All of these experiments worked in accordance 
with their orig inal sp ecifications and a tremendous 
a mount of scientific informat ion was radioed back 
to earth, whe re it h as b een under intensive an alysis 
ever since. From a scient ific viewpoint, this repre-
sented the greatest achievement w hich has yet 
been m ad e in the exploration of space, and h as been 
widely recognized as such. A series of flights of 
essentially the same sp acecraft will he attempted 
towards the immediate vicinity of Mars during 
1964, when M ars and th e earth a pp roach on e an-
other so as to make such a fli ght feasible. 
As larger b oosters b ecom e avail able, a series of 
more elab orate M ariners are planned to make fur-
ther scientific studies of Mars an d Venus during 
their "periods of avail ability" in the 1965-1971 time 
period . Still la ter, wh en th e great Saturn boosters 
enter the picture, a nu mb er of larger and more 
sophisticated spacecraft c alled Voyagers are 
pl anned for unmanned p lan etary explorations. 
Manned Lunar Program 
The country"s Man ned Lunar Program is h y far 
the largest , most expensive, and best p ublicized of 
the United States sp ace efforts. The i\1erc ury Pro-
gram h as alread y carri ed numbers of single as tro-
na uts in orbital fli ghts aro und th e earth, and th e 
Russia ns h ave had similar successful orb ital, 
manned op erations. Th e next step in the NASA 
manned program involves th e so-called Gemini , 
which can carry two astrona uts for much lon ger 
orbital fligh ts and with which attempts will be 
m ad e to rendezvous with, and p erhaps couple to-
gether , two orbitin g vehicles. F inally, using the 
gia nt Saturn booste r, will come the Apollo vehicle, 
wh ose objPctive is to land m en on th e moon and 
return th em safely to earth w ith in th e present 
decade. 
All of these progra ms fall in the scientific or 
explora tory area. There are also important military 
requirements in volving space. H ere discussion is 
limited by security considera tions, hut a few poten-
tial military uses of sp ace aJ·e q uite ob vious and 
h ave b een widely commented on . At th is time, 
these all fall in the category of earth satelli tes, 
rather than involving deep space penetra tion s, and 
some of the major missions which have been pub-
licly identifi ed are included in the following in-
complete list. 
A secure global military communication system 
is essential under the present international condi-
tions, a nd th e use of a syste m of communications 
satellites offers great possibilities. Global naviga-
tion and the precise locati on of vessels, aircraft, and 
targets is of particular concern to the avy, which 
has b een g iven primary responsibility fo r the 
Transit system , using satellites especially designed 
to improve greatl y our present capabilities in this 
area. E arly warning of an ene my's b all istic missi le 
attack is an essential requirement imposed by our 
nation al policy of not ourselves initi atin g such an 
attack, and the Air Force Midas syste m of early 
warnin g satellites is an important current program 
to meet this need . 
The basic imbalance between the U nited States 
strategic intelli gence p osition vis-a-vis that o f the 
USSH results from the fact that ours is essentially 
an open country while the irs is a closed one. Our 
offic ial ab andonm ent of the U -2 reconnaissance 
program m ea ns th at reconnaissance b y satellites 
has become a vitally im portant p ossibility. Actu al 
b ombardment from satellites appears at the m o-
ment to h e mnch less effective than attacks b y 
IC BM's, h ut this may no t continue to be the case 
in the more d istant future. 
It is clear that there arc now, and w ill d evelop 
m any m ore, legitimate military requirements in-
volving the space environment, and th at this coun-
try cannot alford, any more than in a ny other area, 
to permit a ny potential e rw my to develop techno-
logical superiori ty. 
lruluslrial space progra111s 
Turning now to the third of Lhe bas ic moti vations 
for our in volvement in the "space race," namely 
those in the industrial, commercial, or economic 
fi elds, two programs arc alread y b eing actively pur-
sued . The first is aimed at improving our capabil-
ities in the observation and forecastin g of weather. 
Sc\'cral T iros satellites have alread y been success-
full y launch ed and h ave contributed treme ndously. 
In fact, the T iros d ata are now beiug distributed on 
a routine b asis b y th e W eath er Bureau and are 
being used most effectively in all kinds of industrial 
opera tions. The progra m w ill continue w ith more 
sophisticated a nd elabora te satellites which w ill 
s till furthe r enh ance its usefulness. The second pro-
gram is in the field of commerc ia l g lobal communi-
cations. The A.T. and T. Compa ny's Telstar satellite 
was, as everyone h as read , high ly successful in 
intercontinental commu nications, and other more 
advanced projects arc now under active develop -
m ent. 
Whuth e moon? 
There are obviously hund reds of oth er economic 
uses of space which we can't even glimpse until we 
know more about the new environment. Som e of 
the m ost thought-p rovoking pred ictions h ave been 
made b y Arthur C. Clarke, who h as been one of 
the sp ace visionaries in En gland for years, and wh o 
both w rites well and has often h ad his wild predic-
tions full y confirmed. Tn an article in H arper's 
("The Uses of th e loon,'' D ecember 1961 ) 1r. 
C larke considered the p urely economic ad vantages 
of a colony of earth p eople on th e moon. A very 
brief summary of some o f his reasoning and pre-
dictions will perh aps serve to conclude this brief 
survey on an ap propria te note of somewhat awed 
sp eculation. The foll owin g pert inent characteristics 
of the moon underli e his conclusions: 
l. lts surface a rea is l / 16th that of the earth ; 
nearly as much as tha t of the North and South 
American continents combined . 
2. Jts material m ust be made up of the same 
basic ele ments as the earth , such as oxygen, h yd ro-
gen, carbon and iron, although in d ifferent com-
binations than we arc accustomed to, since our 
familiar organic compounds wi ll almost certainly 
be lacking because of th e presumed lack of any 
history of life on th e moon . In princ iple it must h e 
possible to purify or synthesize all of the products 
needed fo r life and comme rce by some sort of lunar 
che mistry. 
3. Because of its sm aller mass th e moon's gravi-
tational attraction is only L 6 th of tha l a t the earth's 
surface. 
4. In view of this low gravitational attraction the 
moon's atmosphere, if it ever had one, has leaked 
off into space, so tha t its surface is surrounded by 
an a lmost perfect vacuu m . 
5. Tlw lack of atmosph ere means no weather; 
there is only the extr('rnely large daily variation in 
temperature (som e 500° F ) a t any point on the 
moon's surface. But vacu um is an ideal insulation, 
hence a simple two-smfaced structure w ith the na-
tural environmental vacuu m b etween w ill m a ke it 
very simple to maintai n the inside of such a struc-
ture at a constant and humanly comfo rtable tem-
p erature. 
6 . The m oon rota tes very slowly so th at its d ay 
a nd nig ht are a month, instead of 24 hours, long. 
And th e rotation is suc h that the same s ide of the 
moon always faces the earth a nd the back sid e is 
shielded from all earth disturbances by billions of 
tons of the lunar mass. 
Fina1ly, it seems certain that within the next 
century controlled thermonuclear power will be de-
veloped so that a few pounds of material trans-
ported to th e moon can furnish enormous sources 
of energy for activities to be carried out there. N u-
clear rockets requiring only hydrogen to be h eated 
and jetted out to furnish rocket thrust are already 
under contract and are scheduled to h e Aown in the 
nex t five or six years. 
What are the potential consequences which may 
he seen as a result of these special lunar and energy 
charac teristics'? 
First- Colonies of humans can b e transported to 
the moon , can create a livable anu even comfort-
able environme nt and produce from lun ar materials 
the requirements for sustaining life and producing 
hydrogen to refuel nuclear-powered space ships. 
Second- Because of the lower gravity, space 
ships can he accelerated to speeds such that they 
can return to the earth or explore outer space w ith 
only a fraction of the power required for our enor-
mous earth-basco boosters. 
Third- In view of the absence of atmospherC' 
such vehicles can be accelerated up to moon escape-
speed of some 5000 m .p.h. , along surface trac ks 
powered by surface-based power plants, and with-
out consuming any precious h ydrogen rocket fu el. 
From earth , with its 25,000 m.p.h. escape-spee<.l an<.l 
its <.lensc surface atmosphere, this is completely im-
possible. Our only method for la unching space ships 
from earth is to use enormous booster rockets 
weighing over 100 tons for each ton of payload sent 
oH'. 
1hus moon-basing does furnish the first conceiv-
able possibility for any really extensive exploration 
of space with payloads and costs which make some 
sort of economic sense. Calculations sh ow that 
great refueling tankers filled with lunar-produced 
h ydrogen could he sent down to orbit the earth as 
satellites at altitudes of a couple of hundred miles, 
ready to service and refuel ea.rth-launche<.l space 
missions. H ere again the economics is tremendous!) 
in favor of such a procedure rather than the pre-
sently planned one of sending refue ling stat ions up 
from the earth. 
Another industrial area opcnell up by moon-
basi ng is th e large and rapidly increasing number 
of industries which require high vacuum as part 
of the production process. On earth, reall y high 
vacuum faci lities arc e normously expensive and 
large ones arc essentiall y impossible. On the moon , 
such high vacuu ms would be just outside the air 
locks of each inhabited struct ure, anll could be 
utilized in ways already vis ualized and others not 
yet even conceived. 
Co1111111111ication tcith the outer uni l'erse 
A final example shows still another great pos-
sibility. Communication wi th , a nd tl1e receipt of 
information from , deep space and the outer univ-
erse is g reatl y restrictc<.l by our atmospheri c blanket 
and by the terrific radio-type noise <'milted by our 
broadcasting stations, au ton1obile ignition systems, 
electric shavers, motors, and so 011. The far si<.le of 
the moon is com pletely shiddecl from these inter-
ferences, and giant rad io-telescopes could be built 
at a fraction of the complex ity of th eir earth-based 
counterparts, both because of the reduced gravity 
and the ahsC'nce of weather disturbances. 
These are but a few of the possible uses of space 
which are already visible and cs!>entiall) -.vithin our 
present capabi lities. The vistas which will open up 
as we learn more of th<' new space environment 
are fascinating and endless. Sonw of us wi ll hope-
fully li ve to sec if not lo participate in them. 
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